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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, Administrator of
the ERtates of l\UNNETTA WALKER,
aka Nettie Walker, deceased, and ILA
:JIINNETTA WALKER, deceased,
.JOHN A.WALKER, deceased, and R. E.
WALKER, ROMA WALKER GROCK
an<l ALTA FAY WALKER LAKE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
and
J. B. WALKER,
Involuntary Plaintiff,

Oase
No.10374

-YS.-

;\ rsTIN "WALKER,
Def end ant and Appellant.

Brief in Support of Petition
for Rehearing

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
So far as pertinent to the petition for rehearing, this
is an action brought by respondents to set aside conveyances of real property to appellant from his mother on
the ground of undue influence and her lack of mental capacity. Appellant claimed ownership to the property or,
3

m the alternati,·e if the court adjudged him not th~
owner, appellant claimed a lien upon the propertv for
taxes paid, improvements made and serviees perfo.nned
in connection therewith

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COl'RT
AND THE SUPREME COURT
The lower court determined the conveyanc€s to appellant from his mother were void upon the ground of
undue influence, denied appellant's motion for a new trial
and refused to grant alternative relief. The Supremf
Court affirmed the lower court except with respect to
alternative relief. The Supreme Court made provision
for an accounting be made by appellant in which he may
claim various credits and he charged with various items
in connection with said property.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks a rehearing on the propriety of
affirming the judgment of the trial court with respect to
avoidance of the deeds to appellant from his mother
on the ground of undue influence and on the propriety
in affirming the trial court in denying a new trial. In the
event a rehearing is denied, appellant seeks clarification
of the opinion heretofore rendered by the eourt in respect
to the aooounting which the court in its opinion author·
ized and directed to be had.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
,\.ppellant does not believe that any purpose would
lw served in attempting to restate the facts. A full and
thorough statement appears in the Briefs already on
fi]P herein to which reference is hereby made.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AFFIBMI~G THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN ·wHICH IT WAS DETERMINED
THE CONVEYANCES TO APPELLANT
FROM HIS MOTHER WERE VOID.
In its opinion this court said:

''"' " " Putting ourselves in the shoes of the trial
court chancellery, as we must, in a case like this,
and gi,·ing considerable consideration to the trial
court's 'view of the scene,' excluding unimportant matters, we cannot say he was in error."
It would appear from the opinion that this court did
give "considerable consideration" to the trial court's
"Yiew of the scene." The trial court's "view of the
scene'' as applied to this case has special significance. At
the close of the evidence the trial court almost in a burst
of feeling made the statements quoted on page 2 of the
opinion indicating that his "view of the scene" was
favorable to appellant, yet the ruling was adverse. We
are aware of the fact that such remarks are not the
appealable decision of the court. We have read with
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...
interest but without comfort this court's treatment of th

t na
. l court ' s apparent change of mind. It would ~,e
1
hel~ful if a floroscopic view of the process of the change
which would app<>ar to have occurred in the trial court's
mind could be had. Although this is impossible yet one
of counsel for appellant made inquiry of the trial C-Ourt
as to what caused him to change his mind and was informed by him that he was fearful the Supreme Court
would not uphold his original view of the case. It would
appear therefore that the appealable decision of the trial
court was not the ''jewel of studious reflection'' as characterized by this court in its opinion. Instead of being
an "off-the-cuff facet" and a mere "gratuity from the
bench,'' the original view expressed by the trial court
is his real decision. At the time the trial court made the
statement from the bench he had heard the evidence, the
facts were well within his mind, he had an opportunity
to observe the witnesss and to form a conclusion as l-0
the veracity of their testimony. It is difficult to concl'i1e
of anything in the argument or in the process of "studious reflection" which could have caused the trial court
to back away from his original view of the case unless it
can be explained by the statement which he made to
counsel for the appellant. While these views of the trial
court are not a part of the official transcript they can be
documented by affidavit and incorporated into the record
if this court should grant a rehearing and an opportunity
so to do.
By reason of the foregoing, appellant respectfully
urges this court to review again the evidence "ith re·
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~pect to u11due influenee and evaluate the same in light

of "·]Jat appears to have been the real decision of the
trial ('Olll'L This heing an equity case the appellate
<·ourt ha:- the responsibility to review the evidence, not
\\ith a \'iPw merely as to whether it sustains the ruling
of tbe trial court but on the merits of the evidence itself.
If the (•\·iclenee is so evaluated, we feel the validity of
tlir dl'edf' from appPllant 's mother must be sustained. It
wouk1 be iuappropriate to burden this court with a repetition of the whole of appellant's argument in his original brief. However, the court will recall that the deeds
wrre executed by appellant's mother in a bank in Mid,·ale, Ptah, in the presence of Dale Waters, Vice President and General ~fanager and were notarized by him
(R. 317, 318) . .Mother Walker told J. B. Walker that
it was her intention that Austin have the property because of the eare that he and his family had given (R.
351). After the deeds had been executed she told J. B.
shr had done so. ( R. 353) Apparently this court overlooked this nry important fact in stating in its opinion
that "Austin told none of the family about this incident,
and it is ob\ious from the records that Mother Walker
did not mention it either.''
There is no direct evidence in the record of undue
influence. At most respondents have done no more than
Rhow opportunity. We again call the court's attention
to the following:
This court held in Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218,
148 P. 433, that family relationship alone is not
Rufficient to establish confidential relationship or
undue influence.
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This court said in Anderson v. Thomas
Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142,
' 108
''The plaintiff must do more than mereh- ·
. .
Tl
. ra1~e
a susp1c10n.
iere must be some affirmativ ·
,.J
t
l
l
R
.
uence o s 10w t mt ichard did exercise ade e11.·
11ating influenr0 over his mother and thuso~.
duced her to part with her property. • • •••
·
This court said
25P.2d610:

rP:

Bryan's Estate, 82 tttah 3q0
..

""' "' "' Tlle opport um't y t o exerr1se
. mfluence
·
uu.
less combined with circumstances tending to ~how
its exercise affords no presumption that it was in
fact exercised.''

POINT NO. II
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN srs.
T AINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHEREIN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S l\IOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The deeds were set aside by the trial court on the
ground of undue influence. It would therefore seem tha'.
testimony from disinterested persons as t-0 Mother
Walker's intent to transfer the property to Austin would
be material upon the question of undus influence. In
fact, this court apparently gave considerable weight to
the erroneous belief that nothing was said to anyone
about transferring the property to Austin. Not only
did she tell J. B. Walker, her son, but also Ray Smith,
Rex Cole and Glen Schmidt, whose testimony would add
further weight to the fact that Mother Walker for many
years had planned to do just what she did. Such en·
dence is of sufficient substance that with it there is 8
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likelihood that the result would have been
differPnt. Fndue influence was not claimed as an issue
in the pretrial order. Appellant could not have anticipated that it would later be the basis upon which the
trial court would set aside the transfers. Such being
the case. appellant should not be charged with lack of
diligence in procuring the newly discovered evidence.
We rrspertfully suhmit that the standards required by
'his court for granting a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence as stated in Universal Investment Compa;ny v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P. 2d
465, haYe been made.
rE>a~onahle

POINT III
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT NEEDS
CLARIFICATION AS TO THE ITEMS APPELLANT ~IAY CLAIM IN THE ACCOUNTING ALLO"\VED BY THIS COURT.
In the event the Court should refuse Appellant a
rehearing on the case, it should nevertheless clarify its
opinion to the end that a proper and adequate accounting may be had between the parties. The Court will
recall that the Walker property consisted of three tracts
of land, a tract of approximately 11 acres shown in pink
on Ex. 3 ; a tract shown in orange on Ex. 3 consisting of
approximately 19 acres, and a tract known as the "creek
property'' but not shown on Ex. 3, consisting of approximately 10 acres. The "pink" tract and the 10 acre tract
are described in the deeds to appellant from his mother
(Ex. P-4 and P-6). The 19 acre tract was involved in
the .J. B. Walker case.
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Austin farmed all of the property, paid taxes on all
of the property and made improvements on all of the
property. It is assumed that this Court intended that
Austin's claims with respect thereto shall apply to all of
the property, above described, but the opinion of the
Court should be clarified specifically so to state.
From approximately 1920 until the present Austin
had almost the sole responsibility for the care of all of
the property (R. 142). It is assumed that the account.
ing should cover the entire period. But here again a
clarification of the matter would facilitate the accounting.
Until 1947 there were cows, horses and chickens on
the property at various times (R. 418) which were cared
for by Austin. Most of the crops grown on the propert:
were used to feed the livestock and were used by the
Walker family (R. 288). After the family store was
closed in the early 1920s the only source of income of
Mother Walker was from the sale of dairy and poultry
products produced on the farm (R. 230). Except for
two or three years when the property was rented, Austin
produced the crops and cared for the livestock. From
the language of the Court's opinion it would appear
that appellant is entitled to be reimbursed not only for
out-of-pocket expense but for the reasonable value of his
labor and services in managing the property and producing the crops, as distinguished from his personal semce8.
Although the opinion refers to "personal" services it
does not attempt to define what are other services for
which appellant should be compensated. We believe
this is not only desirable but mandatory if a properl)'
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accounting is to be had. The Court should at least enli"'hten the parties as to the scope of the items for which
"'
appellant should be given credit as well as the items for
which he should be charged.
CONCLUSION
The principal purpose of this petition for rehearing
is to urge the court to evaluate the evidence with respect
to undue influence. Compelling reasons for this are set
forth iu Point I. If the evidence is viewed on its merits it
warrants but one conclusion - that the validity of the
deeds from his mother to appellant sb'ould be upheld.
In determining that the deed should be avoided on
the ground of undue influence, this court was apparently
of the opinion that in lieu of the property Austin should
be compensated for his services in connection therewith.
As stated aho,;e, appellent respectfully urges that the
court uphold the validity of said deeds. However, if the
court rejects the foregoing, appellant respectfully urges,
in order to minimize the possibility of further litigation,
:hat this court make clarification of the items which he
ma~· elaim in the accounting as suggested in Point III.

Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD R. BOYER
of Romney & Boyer
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
and
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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